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Introduction 
The aim of the present paper is to discuss the ends and scope of economic policy from an 
institutionalist perspective. My point of departure is Wolfram Elsner’s (2012) contention that 
“progressive institutional change remains an issue of proper deliberate, discretionary policy 
action, as institutionalists have always argued” (ibid., p.33). I elaborate on this claim  by focusing 
on how complexity characterizes the economy we live in. In particular I stress that, given the 
different types of coordination that exist within the economy, no pattern of economic evolution 
can be taken for granted. I then discuss how economic coordination and change by a public agency 
can be conceived of. I point out that, owing to the complex features of the economy, two issues 
must be jointly discussed. The first one is what ends policy-makers should pursue. This involves 
the formulation of moral value judgments, concerning what the ends are, thus what change is 
required. The second one is how policy-makers should frame the economy in order to devise the 
means to pursue those ends. This involves the formulation of cognitive value judgments, 
concerning how technical, historical, social and political circumstances determine what can and 
what cannot change.  
The conclusion this discussion leads to is that it is not possible to conceptually separate 
economic theory from economic policy. Only when we properly identify what the societal 
priorities are is it possible to provide an outline of an economy’s and of a society’s evolution, and 
only when such an outline is available are choices actually possible. Thus, only through the 
interaction between moral value judgments and cognitive value judgments can we provide a 
means to adequately deal with economic complexity. 
In the next section, I briefly discuss complexity. I distinguish diachronic and synchronic 
complexity, laying special emphasis on the latter in relation to the systemic openness of the 
economy. In the subsequent section I examine how coordination occurs in an economic system 
characterized by these two dimensions of complexity. I take into account relative prices and 
institutions but also purposive actions that actors take to change the rules of the game to their 
advantage. Given this multifarious coordination, the evolution of the economy may follow many 
different paths, which depend on policy choices. The final section of the paper deals with the 
implications that this framework has for a proper understanding of how economic theory and 
economic policy relate. Some brief concluding remarks end the paper. 
Diachronic and Synchronic Complexity 
Complexity is a multi-faceted phenomenon. A detailed discussion of its characteristics lies 
beyond the scope of this chapter. What I wish to point out is only some of its key features, along 
with their implications for economic analysis and economic policy. 
Simon (1981) described complexity as “many variables interacting in a non-simple way”. The 
non-simple way often depends on changes in the way a variable interacts with others, so that the 
interaction can never be taken for granted. These changes may result from endogenous processes 
that lead to the emergence of new variables or new patterns of interaction which are different 
from the past to the point that they could hardly be predicted beforehand. Intuitively, this is what 
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seems to precede phenomena such as the oil shocks of the 1970s, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
9/11 attack on the Twin Towers.  
The above examples refer to specific historical events, “black swans” that appear to be 
unpredictable because of their uniqueness. More common phenomena abound, however, 
including hyperinflation, core-periphery relations within and among countries, different rates of 
innovation and growth among industries, and financial instability. In order to deal with these kinds 
of “non-simple” interaction in the real-world economy, scholars need to appropriately frame the 
problem. Thus, Elsner (2015: 285) provides a list of properties that usually characterize complex 
systems. At a strictly microeconomic level they are a) composed of huge numbers of similar 
entities, with b) simple patterns of interaction among entities in connection with the c) 
adaptiveness of entities. At a macro level these features lead to 1) limited predictability of future 
states and limited reconstructability of past states by means other than those involving exact 
representations of the system; 2) nonergodicity; 3) emergence of structure, patterns and 
behaviors that are stable but not explicitly and trivially encoded into the systems’ micro-level.  
Compared to conventional models, this framework allows a richer view of the economy in that 
it provides for a variety of possible outcomes that a given group of interacting entities may lead to, 
with equilibrium being only a very special case. It is flexible enough to accommodate different 
assumptions on the patterns of interaction, thereby allowing for a range of sub-disciplinary 
inquiries (e.g. industrial organization, economic policy, etc.) as well as for approaches centered on 
different views of evolution (institutionalist, Austrian, etc.). It provides an account of why and how 
institutions emerge through interaction. Although it is not restricted to dynamic systems, it 
provides conceptual and formal tools to investigate what we may refer to as diachronic 
complexity.  
When we assume that we are dealing with dynamic systems, the usual coeteris paribus 
assumption - i.e. that all other things remain the same - is obviously useful in order to allow 
tractability but it is even more unrealistic than in conventional economics. In general, the entities 
of a system, or the system as a whole, may react to external events or even interact with other 
entities or systems within a higher-order system. This not only suggests that there are higher 
orders of complexity. It also stresses that a distinctive feature of the real-world economy is what 
Kapp (1976) referred to as sequential interaction within a cumulative process. It ultimately 
provides the key elements of a research program centered on evolution.  
There is another notion of complexity that I would like to focus on, however, which I will refer 
to as synchronic complexity. Going back to Simon’s definition, the “non-simple way” that variables 
interact may depend not only on the number and types of interaction and on the types of 
adaptiveness of the entities but on systemic openness (Boulding, 1956; Georgescu-Roegen, 1976; 
Kapp, 1976; Chick, 2004)1.  
An open system is here defined as one that interacts with its surrounding environment in a way 
that is not knowable. Openness means that we do not know the actual boundaries of the system. 
Since everything is, in some way or other, connected to everything else, we are bound to assign a 
boundary to something we wish to investigate and, to this end, we may resort to heuristics. 
Whatever boundaries we choose to delimit the subject of our inquiry, however, is based on a 
                                               
1  I do not consider, here, non-dynamic types of complexity, such as fractals, that are not specifically 
associated to systemic openness. 
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discretional decision. This means that there may always be something we do not take into account 
that may be relevant.  
Note that this has nothing to do with the above mentioned removal of the coeteris paribus 
assumption. What is at issue is neither that there may be external shocks nor that a system may 
be part of a higher order one. The issue is that, depending on the non-simple way that social 
variables interact at every point in time - gender relations, industrial relations or the more or less 
extended nature of the family, just to mention a few examples – they may affect the economic 
system in a variety of ways. This is what makes it so difficult to draw a clear-cut distinction 
between economic and non-economic welfare. Moral sentiments (Smith, 2005) affect the quality 
of life by regulating procurement in one way or other. The clash that sometimes occurs between 
an individual’s preferences and her values (Hirschman, 1984) suggests that the way ethics 
impinges on economic conduct is far from clear. At a macro level, when people react to the 
inconsistency between profitability and serviceability (Veblen, 1919), how this occurs depends on 
how effective ideologies, myths and ethical values are (Dugger, 2000) in justifying or, obversely, in 
denouncing the negative effects that contracted exchange has on society and social cohesion 
(Polanyi, 1944). 
The boundary problem is accentuated by changes that may occur over time: What is irrelevant 
now may become relevant at some time in the future. Openness may depend on changes 
determined by the very processes that underlie diachronic complexity. Consider how the 
expanded use of petroleum as a key energy input for transport, for electricity and for heating, 
eventually changed the extension of these markets around the world, thus the type of interaction 
within and among them. Changes such as these affect relative prices but also the balance of power 
within society. A new industry such as the oil industry leads to the insurgence of vested interests 
in the exporting as well as in the importing countries. It is likely to affect the political regimes of 
the countries involved, either by empowering those vested interests within those countries or 
subjecting those countries to the economic and political will of foreign vested interests. These 
changes feed back on the cultural and religious values of the populations, sometimes determining 
radical changes in the polity, in international relations, in the balance between both domestic and 
international power groups. As we look at these historical processes, we are obliged to 
acknowledge that they affect the economic performance of the oil market, of a great many other 
markets, of trends in growth and in income distribution, etc.  
These examples suggest that variables that are of minor relevance at some point in time may 
subsequently become more relevant. Thus, although the distinction between synchronic and 
diachronic complexity is useful on conceptual grounds the two types of complexity often are 
interdependent in the real world.  
This brief outline of the key features of complexity raises the issue whether, and to what 
extent, there is a way to coordinate such a complex environment, possibly attaining order out of 
chaos. This is the topic of the next section. 
Variety in Coordination 
Relative prices associated to contracted exchange are generally considered the typical 
coordinating instance in a capitalist market economy. This claim needs to be qualified, however. It 
is fairly easy to acknowledge that the economies we live in are indeed coordinated by prices but 
also by a range of institutions. The role that institutions play remains an open issue among 
economists, however. New Institutionalists such as Coase (1937; 1960) and Williamson (1975; 
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1993a; 1993b; 2000) point out that the market operates in a relatively costly fashion, whereby it is 
possible to devise institutions that reduce those costs. Institutions therefore may allow a relatively 
more efficient allocation of resources, where efficiency is cost-effectiveness.  
“Efficiency” as cost-effectiveness should not be confused with overall (Paretian) allocative 
efficiency. Cost-effectiveness only means that a single actor can reduce her costs. For instance, 
firm A may cut its transaction costs by taking over a company – firm B - that carries out R&D and 
sells it on the market. While this is convenient for firm A, it restricts the very scope of the market. 
The resulting firm (A + B) will avoid disclosing what presumably provides it with a competitive 
advantage. Furthermore, following the takeover, firm (A + B) may have less incentive to innovate 
since it can outcompete other firms through lower transaction costs, without any need to focus 
entirely on a nevertheless risky qualitative upgrading of its products and/or production processes. 
It may remain competitive, but in the context of a “low road” to development (Sengenberger, 
1992; Milberg, 2005). 
The above considerations apply even if we accept the (mostly implicit and rather unrealistic) 
assumption that markets are impersonal. Economic actors, however, do not merely react to 
prices. They purposively interact - through rivalry, cooperation, imitation, predation – in order to 
change not only prices but the bargaining power between firms and workers as well as among 
firms within the production chain. As a result they preclude the ideal competitive environment 
where relative prices ought to carry out their coordinating function. Indeed, the firms who act this 
way affect the decisions of other actors, so that they exert a coordinating action which cannot be 
separated from other transactions-centered relations. This effect is, generally, greater as their size 
increases. 
An important implication is that markets are not independent of the action of the firms. They 
may well operate as selection mechanisms but the nature of such a selection depends on the 
action of those very firms that should be selected (Ramazzotti, 2002). Markets do not provide an 
independent terms of reference to assess whether what firms do is efficient or not for the 
economy as a whole. Both the distinction between the market and institutions and the distinction 
between efficiency-centered and strategizing behavior turn out to be impracticable, under these 
circumstances.  
While the Coase-Williamson tradition focuses on institutions that make up for the inefficiency 
of the market, North (1990; 2005) focuses on extra-economic institutions such as, for instance, 
religion. It is these institutions that, in his view, may be a major cause of inefficiency in terms of 
low rates of growth. The reason is that they may provide behavioral rules that preclude 
maximizing behavior. Since these institutions are strongly related to beliefs, changing them is not 
an easy task. 
Both of these New Institutionalist accounts of the role of institutions assume that the market is 
the logical point of departure for any inquiry. Institutions may increase or reduce its efficiency and 
this is how their economic relevance is assessed. An alternative strand of thought, centered on 
Original Institutional Economics, but which can be traced back to Adam Smith and his theory of 
moral sentiments, denies this centrality of the market. It argues that, historically, not all types of 
economy have been coordinated through contracted exchange and the relative prices that it leads 
to. Quite to the contrary, since all economies are a sub-system of society, they are all regulated in 
one way or another. They all need some kind of institutional setup to coordinate activities, with or 
without the concurrent action of relative prices (Polanyi, 1957). 
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Following this perspective, let us consider the economy we live in. No price system may exist 
unless it is backed up by a set of rules that allow it to function. More specifically, all sets of relative 
prices depend on some legal-economic nexus (Commons, 1924; Schmid, 1987; Bromley, 1989; 
Samuels, 1994; Samuels, 1997). Property rights need to be assigned, appropriate behavior – 
hence, also misbehavior – among actors must be defined, possible sanctions must also be 
identified, and some organization has to inflict those sanctions. Furthermore, the very extension 
of coordination by relative prices has to be decided. For instance, human beings as well as  parts of 
their bodies may or may not be subject to contracted exchange.  
The above institutions require some ethical system to exist, i.e. criteria that determine how 
they are to regulate (economic) activity. For instance, the assignment of property rights may be 
based on efficiency criteria – however defined – but also on distributional equity, or historical 
accident, war, force and fraud The extension of the price mechanism may depend on the 
importance assigned to alternative criteria in the production and distribution of resources, as in 
the case of the welfare state. The organization of production may depend on what is most 
profitable but other criteria may hold: Consider the protection of social rights as they appear in a 
range of important charters such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).  
There would seem to be a common ground for discussion between those New Institutionalist 
scholars who, like North, emphasize the importance of beliefs – and, more generally, mental 
models (Denzau, 1994; North, 2005) – and Original Institutionalist scholars who stress the 
relevance of ethics. Indeed, these appear to be different ways to look at the same phenomenon 
(Dequech, 2002). What beliefs, ethics and institutions in general  imply for the functioning of the 
market should be clearly stated, however. They determine rights for someone, thus duties for 
someone else (Commons, 1990). They determine the choice sets of economic actors, thus what 
they can do and what they cannot do. Precisely because they determine “who may do what to 
whom” (Bromley, 1989, p. 49), they are a pre-requisite for the market, thereby undermining the 
latter’s presumed centrality. Truly, a given institutional set-up may deter economic growth. But 
the contention that this is tantamount to inefficiency reflects an implicit assumption: that growth 
is more important than the institutions that “constrain” the market. While the value judgment 
underlying this assumption is legitimate, it is no more so than the value judgments underlying the 
establishment of the “growth-deterring” institutional setup. It is indeed a consequence of the 
systemic openness of the economy that such a clash in value judgments may occur. 
Systemic openness implies that the economy does not just reflect the institutional setup 
determined by society. It also feeds back, thereby affecting society and how it changes over time. 
The output produced, the techniques used, the labor relations established: These and other 
circumstances affect the organization of society, how it functions and how it pursues both its 
economic and not economic ends. Thus, how people work – the number of hours, the stress, the 
safety conditions – as well as the income they receive, affects how they live in general, how they 
take part in other dimensions of their societal life, how they understand the world that surrounds 
them and that they are a part of (Scott, 1995; Dequech, 2014)2. This understanding, in turn, feeds 
back on how people deal with that world, i.e. the extent to which they (intend to) accept it as it is 
                                               
2  Needless to say, advertisements are another important example in that they do not merely inform 
but exert their power of suggestion, they act upon the perception that people have of (sections of) reality 
and, consequently, the interpretations and explanations they subsequently elaborate.  
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or, alternatively, attempt to change part or all of it. Ultimately, it affects the way they contribute 
to the formation of the institutions that guide their lives (Hodgson, 2002).   
This leads us to the conclusion that the beliefs people have, their understanding of the world 
they live in and the ethics that derives from this understanding affect the institutional setup that 
underlies the economy. Knowledge in this broad sense is as much a coordinating instance as the 
ones mentioned above. It is not independent of them, however, since the economy affects how 
people behave, what they choose and how they learn.  
The above discussion stresses that coordination in the economy we live in involves markets, 
institutions and knowledge. This is generally consistent with the so-called micro-meso-macro 
framework, whereby “we define micro as the level of individual agents and their interactions. As 
soon as some ‘structure’ (institution) has emerged that exists independently from individual 
agents, we understand this to belong to the meso level if a ‘meso’-sized ‘carrier group’ has been 
co-evolving with that structure. A meso-sized group, in turn, is defined in our model as any group 
of a size smaller than the whole population involved. The latter, finally, may be considered then to 
reflect the macro level, mirroring the real-world ‘national’ level mentioned (considered as the 
space of more formal institutions and agency).” (Elsner, 2010, p. 449). The distinction between 
these three levels may be useful from a heuristic point of view. It has also been used to provide an 
account of coordination that would support a general theory of economic evolution (Dopfer, 
2009).  It is therefore important to assess whether and how the framework actually provides 
insights on coordination. 
Let us focus on the micro level. Two apparently opposite features have to be pointed out. The 
first one is that, in so far as economic actors pursue their specific goals, they are likely not to 
appreciate what happens at the macro level. A typical example is the paradox of thrift whereby, if 
individuals attempt to increase their savings, the aggregate outcome is a fall in output but no 
change in overall saving. This unawareness of the consequences of one’s individual action 
accounts for the independent status of the micro level. It also justifies the existence of an agency 
that operates at the aggregate level. 
The second feature is that economic actors may well be aware of potentially undesired 
outcomes. They may consequently act in order to avoid them. They may act in two distinct ways. 
The first one is to adapt to circumstances in order to achieve a better outcome. This is what 
underlies a lot of game theory. As Loasby (1991, p. 44) points out, however, “Nash equilibria 
constrain each individual as tightly as perfect  competition, and have the advantage that the 
discovery of such equilibria apparently requires neither an auctioneer nor any transactions which 
might disturb the outcome, but simply  individual ratiocination. All actions are therefore 
equilibrium  actions, as a rigorous insistence on optimization demands.  However, each Nash 
equilibrium requires all players to be smart  enough to work out the implications of the rules of 
the game, but  not smart enough to recognize the potential advantages of varying  them. They are 
only boundedly rational  after all.”. The second type of conduct, therefore, is to proactively change 
those very circumstances, that is, to vary the rules of the game. 
In terms of the micro-meso-macro framework, economic actors may not only abide by the 
existing rules of the game and, through interaction, generate new rules. They may also purposively 
act on the trajectories that allow a rule to spread out in the economy. A meso level – where such 
trajectories occur – must obviously exist but the rules that will eventually prevail and play a 
significant role at the macro level will not necessarily result from an unintentional diffusion. Single 
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actors may play a coordinating role that interferes and downplays the impersonal one that 
independent actors would allow for.   
Independently of how they behave as economic actors, individuals are not only that. Because of 
systemic openness, they can hardly be reduced to that feature. As mentioned above, they are able 
to transcend their conventional economic goals when it comes to assessing their quality of life and 
the quality of life of the people around them. For instance, although, based on their specific 
economic activity, they may be unable to understand the causes of such appalling circumstances 
as unemployment or poverty, they may nonetheless feel that something is going wrong and think 
about how to fix the situation. They may therefore act as citizens – as opposed to single economic 
actors – so that a public agency may take appropriate measures. Little matters that the measures 
they ask for may be successful or not. What is relevant is that individuals may broaden the scope 
for institutions: The meso need not be conventionally economic.  
Since the set of institutions that emerge at the meso level may or may not fit together, the 
macro level should ensure an adjustment process. Economic activity cannot be isolated from the 
rest of human concerns, however, so institutions have to do with many, if not all, of such 
concerns. There is no a priori reason to believe that they will eventually fit together. The typical 
Hayekian contention that markets self-organize is of little use here, not only because self-
organization cannot be taken for granted but, above all, because markets are intermingled with a 
great many other societal variables. 
These features allow us to look at the macro level as the outcome of a range of actions that 
often are proactive, may be strategic and are not necessarily restricted to conventional economic 
variables. Consequently, coordination cannot be restricted to the economy – not to mention the 
market. It has to do with whatever individuals deem so relevant that it affects their actions. 
Furthermore, it occurs not only in a bottom-up fashion –  from the micro to the meso and, finally 
to the macro – but also the other way round, in a top-down fashion. 
Summing up, there are various coordinating instances that act upon the economy and the 
society it is a part of. To some extent, this accounts for the complexity described in the first 
section of this paper. On the other hand, owing to some balance of power or temporary 
convergence of interests, some dominant institutions may emerge and ensure an order out of 
what would otherwise be total chaos. This may account for the persistence of the institutional 
setup that is generally labeled “capitalism” as well as for the persistence, within capitalism, of 
periods of relative stability. A full picture, however, requires us to look at the last coordinating 
instance: government action.  
Given the above discussion on complexity and coordination, two issues should be pointed out. 
First, just as economic actors try to influence the way they are supposed to interact, so may a 
government. The second issue is that, whatever the ends government action pursues, policy-
makers must somehow make sense of a complex environment. These issues are discussed in the 
section that follows. 
Public action 
The discussion of complexity and of coordination leads to the conclusion that there is no 
general law that we can rely on when we try to describe the economy and the society we live in. 
The attempt to somehow regulate or direct the evolution of the economy is just as problematic. 
This does not mean that the conclusions lead us nowhere, however. It simply tells us that no 
mechanistic description or policy is available (Sotolongo, 2004).  
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One key point that arises from the discussion is that coordination occurs in at least three 
distinct, but interactive, ways: through prices; through institutions; through the proactive and 
strategic action of single actors. Institutions and the structure of knowledge consist in enabling 
constraints for economic actors. They provide for some stability in the economy because they 
usually tend to change slowly. The conditions they determine allow actors to choose according to 
relative prices. It is precisely because of their enabling and constraining function, however, that 
actors often try to change them: The evolution of financial markets in the USA over the past 
decades is a case in point (Varoufakis, 2011). Coordination is a contested process: Different 
economic actors try to direct the economy in one way or other. They do so within an institutional 
setup that reflects but also feeds back on that interaction.  
Can a policy-maker act in a consistent way upon this complex reality? Can she make sense of 
economic change? Doubtless, the issues discussed above provide tools for the economist’s toolbox 
but they do not provide an explanation. Indeed, if the term “explanation” refers to a fairly 
accurate description of the economy and of how it evolves, a range of problems arise.  
The systemic openness of the economy raises a key issue. How should the economy be 
circumscribed? What does it consist of? Is it the market as it is described by standard 
microeconomics textbooks? Is it the market plus government agencies and, perhaps, nonprofit 
organizations? Does it include unions, lobbies, political parties, religious organizations? Openness 
implies that we cannot trace a once and for all boundary. It also suggests that when we do trace a 
boundary – possibly because we choose to focus on a specific issue - we are not only leaving some 
variables out of our inquiry; we are assuming away possible interactions between what we include 
and what we leave out. Only to some extent can we rely on a subsequent extension of our model 
and inquiry. As the boundaries change, the nature of the interactions – not just their extension – 
may change as well. Complexity hardly allows for reductionist practices that merely add up the 
results of distinct inquiries. 
Given their different concerns and their bounded rationality (Simon, 1976), economic actors are 
likely to formulate different assumptions with regard to the boundaries of the economy. Thus, in 
order to plan its business activities, a local construction company may focus on information 
concerning local income growth and on what building areas will be made available by local 
authorities. A local importer of foreign cars and a multinational company are likely to be less 
concerned about how those authorities manage the local territory than about changes in the 
exchange rate, thus about monetary policy. All these companies, however, share a common goal: 
making money. There are different ways to go about doing this but the goal is fairly clear.  
Individuals may want to make money just like any economic actor but, unlike business, they 
may pursue  other goals as well. As we mentioned above, the quality of life may involve more than 
money. Given these premises, their notion of the economy is less straightforward than that of 
businesses.  
Policy-makers try to make sense of reality in much the same way as individuals. They must 
decide what their policy goals are. They must subsequently understand how to achieve them. As 
far as the first issue is concerned, systemic openness suggests that no once and for all distinction is 
possible between economic and non-economic ends and that there is no reason to give 
precedence to conventionally economic ones. There is a broad range of policy perspectives that 
governments can choose from. Which one they do choose depends on the ultimate end that they 
pursue. Examples of such ends include Sen’s (1999) development as freedom, Layard’s (2005) and 
Kahneman’s (1997; 1999) notion of happiness, the forceful establishment of the institutions 
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required for a neoliberal market (Foucault, 2004; Brown, 2005; Ramazzotti, 2014a) or the 
straightforward protection of some vested interest. Choosing among these and other options 
obviously involves moral value judgments: deciding how the economy and society should be, i.e. 
what values should be assigned a priority. 
Given an end, how can policy-makers choose the appropriate policy? In order to deal with this 
question it is necessary to qualify the economy they are referring to. The issue is not only that, 
given systemic openness, everything is connected to everything else. The issue is that it is 
necessary to decide what is deemed constant and what is deemed subject to change. Consider, for 
instance, a Prisoners’ Dilemma. The decision to identify and pursue the appropriate way to 
achieve a Pareto optimal outcome sounds reasonable. It implicitly assumes, however, that the 
payoffs are given. In broader terms, here, just as in any case where the goal is a Pareto 
improvement, the extant distribution (usually, the endowments) is taken as given. This is a 
legitimate value judgment but nothing else. One might just as well consider the possibility of 
changing the existing distribution. 
A decision such as this one – whether distributional conditions are potentially subject to change 
– actually involves two different interconnected value judgments. The first one is whether such an 
action is feasible, i.e. whether there are institutional, political or other circumstances that 
preclude such a change, at least in the time interval that is relevant for the policy-maker.  The 
second one is up to what point policy should attempt to change a given situation. Since it is 
generally the case that someone benefits from a policy but someone else is damaged, when is this 
policy deemed appropriate? 
Although the two value judgments are linked, the first one relates to how the economy is 
understood to be structured and to function whereas the second one has to do with how costs 
should be shared within society. The first one is a cognitive value judgment whereas the second 
one is a moral value judgment. 
The two steps outlined here – identifying a goal and circumscribing the economy – are not the 
end of the story. Once the economy is properly depicted, only a proper inquiry will provide an 
understanding of whether and how the goal may actually be achieved. In turn, the resulting 
knowledge may lead to a reassessment of the goal, thus to a reassessment of the boundaries of 
the economy, and so on in an iterative process. 
There is more to the value judgments discussed so far. Leaving aside the restrictive case of 
Pareto optimality, consider a policy – e.g. the introduction of a new technology - that is expected 
to make everybody better off, independently of any ceremonial valuation. The problem is how this 
specific end in view – making people better off – relates to the ultimate ends outlined above. If the 
new technology increases the income available to everybody but reinforces an undesirable 
division of labor among genders or among social classes, should it be valued positively in 
instrumental terms? The answer cannot be given a priori. It involves answering a question 
concerning the possibility to actually change – possibly with some alternative policy – the existing 
division of labor. We are back to the combination of moral and cognitive value judgments. 
The objection that the answer depends on what people want, thus in deliberative democracy, is 
not a convincing one. As Sen (1999) argues with his example of the Indian woman – who is 
unaware that her subordinate position in the family and in society precludes her from living a 
better life – people may well internalize the values underlying the organization of the economy 
and of society. What is at issue is that any instrumental valuation reflects the status quo. More 
specifically, as Samuels (1977: 882) argues, “‘Efficiency’ is a function of power and the valuational 
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process (governing whose interests count) which operates through the power structure.”. Thus, no 
instrumental valuation is possible unless one clearly distinguishes what can and should change 
from what cannot and/or should not. 
On more methodological grounds, what I am suggesting is that, while it is reasonable to 
conceive of models that focus on specific aspects of reality and deal with them according to 
whatever tools the scholar deems appropriate, the true issue is how and where to identify and 
circumscribe them. Conventional economic analysis conceives of the economy as a closed system. 
It starts out with a set of axioms and elaborates on them by deducing economic laws and applying 
them to general and special cases. The complexity discussed so far, however, suggests that you 
cannot proceed this way. An alternative approach, therefore, consists in formulating a 
discretionary judgment concerning what is relevant, quite independently of axioms3.  
Relevance, here has two interdependent dimensions. The first one is that the questions 
underlying the inquiry should be made explicit4. They include the ultimate end pursued which, 
when we focus on a policy perspective, inevitably involves a moral value judgment. The second 
one is that the categories used and the theory they lead to must be grounded in a 
methodologically rigorous procedure. By this I mean that it must be possible to understand the 
assumptions – as well as the arguments - underlying the inquiry5. This involves another type of 
value judgment – a cognitive value judgment - which has to do with the general idea one has of 
how the economy is and of how it should be investigated6. 
Although complexity hardly allows for clear-cut economic laws, the above approach does allow 
the tools in the economist’s toolbox to grow and to provide insights. These insights may not lead 
to a full-fledged theory but they may reduce the degree of uncertainty that any policy decision 
involves. 
I already pointed out that, contrary to conventional views, policy is not constrained by relative 
prices alone. It is constrained by the institutional setup, which determines how transactions occur 
and how relative prices are determined. It is also constrained by the conduct of other actors and 
by the patterns of change this conduct may determine. Policy has to cope with actors who 
contrast any measure that clashes with their, actual and potential, vested interests as well as with 
their views of what is appropriate. From this perspective, policy cannot be envisaged as a set of 
fixed institutions and incentives that allow the market to operate successfully, thereby making 
economic actors behave in a desired fashion. Rather, it is a continuous process where vested 
interests try to contrast public action, thereby forcing government to counter-react, only to be 
followed by a new reaction, etc.. Public action obviously involves recourse to the economist’s tool 
box, with a clear understanding of the cognitive value judgments that underlie it. It also involves 
an ongoing interaction with other actors since, as Stanfield (2009, p. 11) points out, “[w]hile it is 
true that any regulatory scheme tends to bring forth efforts to evade control, this only means that 
regulation must be continuously reformed not that it must be abandoned.”. 
The denial of a mechanistic account of how the economy works suggests that, as a general rule, 
policy cannot consist in switching a structural model of the economy into its inverse reduced form. 
                                               
3  A more detailed discussion of these themes is in Dow (1996, 2008). 
4  This a key theme in Myrdal (1978, 19982). 
5  This issue is at the origin of Delorme’s (2010) discussion of deep complexity and how it can be 
anchored. 
6  A more detailed discussion of moral and cognitive value judgments is in Ramazzotti (2014b). 
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This difficulty arises because any (structural) model is not only an approximation in the sense that 
it abstracts from trivial issues, i.e. issues that are not important for a correct understanding of a 
core issue. It is an approximation because – owing to complexity - it cannot definitely distinguish 
core issues from trivial ones7. This approximation can be improved upon but it cannot be 
overcome. The gap between a model and reality is not filled with more information. It requires 
greater understanding. Contrary to what is likely to occur in a closed system, uncertainty does not 
necessarily fall as you increase the available information. Uncertainty may increase because the 
new information suggests that aspects of the core issue were not taken account of. The decisions 
concerning the boundaries, the heuristics and the time devoted to the inquiry may prove to be 
inappropriate, thereby undermining the previous understanding. 
Concluding remarks 
Contrary to the impression that one might get from a cursory look at the previous sections, the 
aim of the paper is not to argue that any policy is doomed to failure because of the absence of 
appropriate terms of reference such as a clear-cut theory of how the economy is coordinated. It is 
that policy-makers should free themselves of the bounds that a simplistic view of the economy 
suggests. By simplistic view I refer to the belief that there is an automatism that coordinates the 
conduct of economic actors. The complexity of the economy depends on the co-existence of 
diverse, and sometimes inconsistent, coordinating instances. This results in economic and social 
outcomes that most often reflect the predominant role of sectional - vested – interests. It also 
results in a difficulty – for all actors - to single out a pattern of behavior and performance of the 
economy, i.e. to formulate reliable expectations about the future. 
The policy implications are that the pursuit of some sort of social welfare implies dealing with 
the strategies of the sectional interests as well as reducing the degree of uncertainty in the 
economy. The actual policies, however, cannot be devised in the conventional way, which consists 
in taking a model from political economy and identifying the appropriate objective and 
instrumental variables. The reason for this is that an important gap exists between any model and 
historical reality.  
To some extent this is consistent with David Colander’s (2014) claim that “policy search 
requires a practical sense of real-world institutions, a comprehensive knowledge of past literature, 
familiarity with history, and a well-tuned sense of nuance.” (ibid., p. 489). My point, however, is 
that, economic knowledge depends on the questions we ask and on the assumptions we make 
concerning what is given and what can be changed. Policy-makers cannot simply add extra-
economic knowledge to (neutral) economic models.  
In a general context of uncertainty policy-makers must formulate a decision concerning what 
societal problems should be addressed. This involves asking whether a change is possible that 
solves those problems. In turn, this leads to the use of the economist’s toolbox in order to frame 
the problems in an account of how the economy is working. The resulting account of the economy 
allows the policy-maker to assess the original problems in the light of what appears to be possible. 
The assessment is the starting point for a recursive process which eventually will allow the policy-
maker to formulate an educated guess over what to do. 
                                               
7  Following Musgrave’s (1981) taxonomy, it is not possible to properly distinguish between 
“domain” and “heuristic” assumptions. 
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Complexity involves that the economic and extra-economic dimensions cannot be conceptually 
separated. Consequently, the scope of economic knowledge cannot be defined a priori. It is the 
result of a sequential interaction between the identification of the ends to be pursued and an 
appropriate understanding of what issues, boundaries, variables and forms of interaction are 
relevant to those ends. 
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